Lakers 99, Detriot 91 [O.T.]: In defending Tom Lasorda from second-guessing following his decision to pitch to Jack Clark rather than Andy Van Slyke in Game 6 of the 1985 NLCS, Bill James once wrote that it is always easier to take the test after you know the answers. This morning, Larry Brown's decision to not foul any of the Lakers in the final fifteen seconds has raised hackles in every newspaper, radio show and barstool in the country, and the criticism is equally unfair.

The reasoning of Brown's attackers goes something like this: fouling a player immediately sends him to the line to shoot two, and the Pistons maintain the lead for at least two possessions. Much has been said about the supposed "unwritten rule" that teams never intentionally foul a player when that team is ahead by more than two points at the end of the game. What that obscures is the context of that decision. Even for a great player like Kobe Bryant, the likelihood of hitting a trey is ordinarily close to 33%; during the playoffs, when the opposing defense is, almost by definition, tougher, that percentage dips into the mid-to-high twenties.

On the other hand, Bryant is an 85% free throw shooter, so sending him to the line is a likely two-point gift. In order to have fouled Bryant before he was in the act of shooting would have required Rip Hamilton to have been almost on top of him by the time he got the ball, so the probable result in that situation would have been to stop the clock with about nine seconds to play (any hesitation on Hamilton's part in getting over to Bryant would have resulted in a shot attempt, sending Kobe to the line for three frees and a chance to tie, or even a chance for a four-point play). If he makes both free throws, the lead is one, Pistons' ball, but plenty of time to foul or cause a turnover. The Lakers still get another chance to tie or win the game. And that assumes Kobe makes both shots; if he misses the second, the Lakers happen to have the most dominant inside player in the game poised to get an offensive board and put-back, and you're looking at the same situation all over again.

And that, of course, assumes that Bryant gets fouled before he can get off a shot. But what if the Pistons had fouled O'Neal when he caught the in-bounds pass, twenty feet from the basket. Shaq gave up the ball almost immediately, so any attempt at playing Hack-a-Shaq would have been risky; if he had been fouled a millisecond after passing the ball to Walton, the Pistons would have been called for an intentional foul, sending Shaq to the line and giving the Lakers the ball out of bounds. Even with the Lakers' star's proclivity for inept free throw shooting, that would not have been a worthwhile risk for the Pistons.

So under the circumstances, Brown made the right call. The clock is the greatest ally for the team that's ahead in that situation. Each additional possession increases the chances for disaster, so the last thing a coach wants to do is stop the clock. Ten days ago, the Lakers had turned a nine-point deficit in Minnesota into a two-point deficit in the final ten seconds, using a maddening diet of threes and time outs. Playing for their lives, it is safe to say that the Lakers would have pulled out all the stops again in the final seconds, even with no timeouts remaining, had Detroit chosen to foul early. Only seconds earlier, when the Lakers were down by six, Bryant had bricked a wide-open three, and his fourth quarter shooting percentage from outside during the playoffs was mediocre, to say the least. By contesting Bryant but not fouling him, the odds were heavily in the Pistons' favor that he would miss, and the game (and series) would be over. It just didn't work out that way.